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CRANE'S BASIS: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE CRANE
DECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
CONCEPT OF BASIS*
I.
INTRODUCTION
Possibly one of the most fundamental and, at the same time, one
of the most complex concepts of taxation is that of "basis." This broad
term describes the capital investment in property and serves as the depar-
ture point for determining the gain or loss on a sale or other exchange,
as well as for computing depreciation and depletion. The function of
"basis" is to provide a tax-free recovery of investment.1 The taxpayer
is permitted to recover his cost, or what can be construed as his cost,
without tax consequences and prior to a determination of gain or loss on
the transaction.2
The Code provides simply that the basis of property shall be the
cost thereof.8 The basis is determined immediately upon acquisition by
the taxpayer, and need not represent a cash outlay only. Cost, like basis,
is a concept that the tax field has derived from the accountants and
economists. It signifies any sacrifice in money, or the equivalent thereof,
that is made toward the acquisition of the property.4
The basis of property, whether it be cost or some other valuation,
is rarely used without change for tax purposes, but must be adjusted
for such items as depreciation, depletion, capital recoveries and capital
expenditures. The resultant figure gives the working unit of "adjusted
basis." The same approach is utilized in computing the "basis" used for de-
termining depreciation or depletion. Adjustments are made at the beginning
of the taxable year, and the depreciation or depletion is computed on that
basis with reference to the remaining useful life of the property. As a general
rule, adjusted basis is used in computing gain or loss from the sale or
other disposition of property. 6 It is fundamental that the gain or loss is
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Milton A. Dauber, a member
of the Pennsylvania Bar, and chairman of the Sales, Exchanges and Basis Committee
of the ABA Section of Taxation, for his cooperation and direction in this topic.
1. Rubin, How Mortgages Affect Basis; the Rules are in Accord With Economic
Reality, 13 J. TAXATION 38 (1960).
2. Detroit Edison Co. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
3. INT. REv. CODV OF 1954, § 1012 - Basis of Property-Cost.
§ 1012 - The basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except as
otherwise provided in this subchapter and subchapters C (relating to corporate
distributions and adjustments), K (relating to partners and partnerships), and
P (relating to capital gains and losses). The cost of real property shall not include
any amount in respect of real property taxes which are treated under section
164(d) as imposed on the taxpayer.
The 1939 Code, § 113(a), similarly provided that the basis of property was its cost,
subject to certain adjustments.
4. Wurzel, The Tax Basis for Assorted Bargain Purchases or: The Inordinate
Cost of "Ersatz" Legislation, 20 TAX L. Rev. 165 (1964).
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1011 ; Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-1.
6. Ibid.
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always determined by the difference between the "tax basis or cost,' 7 and
the proceeds or "amount realized."" The amount realized for the property
is generally the total consideration received by the taxpayer for its transfer,
less his expenses, that is, the monetary equivalent of the total economic
benefit derived by the taxpayer.9
II.
BASIS OF PROPERTY ENCUMBERED BY MORTGAGES
The complexities of the tax problems attendant a sale, transfer or
other disposition of real property are aggravated by the existence of
mortgages. 10 Placing a mortgage on the property, in and of itself, has
no tax consequences, in the sense that it is neither a sale nor an exchange
of the property. The mortgagor remains the owner of the property after
execution of the mortgage as he was before." W'hile, practically speaking,
the mortgage may exhaust the value of the property, for tax purposes
the mortgagor has merely pledged the property as security. Irrespective
of the basis, neither gain nor loss accrues to the mortgagor by virtue
of the mortgage transaction. 12 Thus, if a taxpayer bought property for
$50,000 and subsequently mortgaged it for $75,000 he has realized no
gain.' 3 Mere receipt of the mortgage proceeds produces no taxable in-
come. Taxation must await a subsequent sale or exchange of the property;
only then is the transaction completed. 14
However, upon a subsequent disposition, such as a sale, foreclosure,
or voluntary surrender of the property, the mortgage is taken into account
in determining the mortgagor's gain or loss, and the buyer's basis. The
inclusion of mortgages in the basis rests partially on an assumption that
the mortgage will eventually be paid." Thus, where the purchaser as-
sumes the seller's mortgage liability, the amount of the indebtedness is
includable in the amount realized by the seller. 16 Likewise, the amount
must be included in the buyer's basis for future computations. Where
the purchaser, rather than assuming the indebtedness, merely takes the
7. The term "tax basis" has been applied to the Crane situation and its successors,
discussed in Sections II and III infra. In its use the term has become almost synony-
mous with "adjusted basis" for that type situation. See, Lurie, Mortgagor's Gain on
Mortgaging Property for More Than Cost Without Personal Liability (Contentions
of Taxpayer's Counsel in a Pending Case), 6 TAX L. Rxv. 319, 326 (1951).
8. Meyer, Disposition of Real Estate Where Mortgage Indebtedness Exceeds
"Tax Basis," N.Y.U. 7THT INST. ON F]m. TAX. 338 (1949).
9. PH STAND. FED. LAW OF TAX S4RV., Vol. 2 (1965), 1 10,031, 10,036.
10. 3A MSRTENS, FEURAL INcOmE TAXATION § 21.11 (Zimet & Weiss Ed. 1958).
11. See Judge Hand's opinion in Comm'r v. Crane, 153 F.2d 504, 506 (2d
Cir. 1945).
12. For a general discussion of the area see, Rusoff, The Federal Income Tax
Consequences of Transactions Relating to Mortgages 00 Land, 4 BUFFALO L. REv.
181 (1955).
13. Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'g, 16
T.C. 649 (1951) ; Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
14. Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
15. B. F. Avery & Sons, 26 B.T.A. 1393 (1932), appeal dismissed, 67 F.2d 985
(6th Cir. 1933).
16. U.S. v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
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property subject to it, different consequences may ensue. The question
arises whether the purchaser has acquired anything more than an equity
in the property, thereby excluding the amount of the unassumed indebted-
ness from his basis.17
III.
THE Crane DEcislON
This latter problem confronted the Supreme Court in the leading
case of Crane v. Commissioner.'s The question arose in determining
the amount of taxable gain arising from the acquisition of an apartment
house and the land on which it stood through devise. The amount of the
unassumed mortgage which encumbered the property was found to equal
the fair market value of the property at the date of death for Federal
Estate Tax purposes. Depreciation deductions subsequently allowed were
based on the full, undiminished value of the property.' 9 To avoid fore-
closure, this property was later transferred by the taxpayer to a third
party, still subject to the indebtedness, for a small amount of cash (the
net cash receipt to the taxpayer was $2,500). The taxpayer claimed that
the outstanding balance of the encumbrance should not be added to the
cash received in determining the amount realized on the transfer, since
the mortgage had never been personally assumed. The Tax Court,20
accepting the taxpayer's claim, found that her realized gain was only
the money or "boot" received since her basis was only her equity in the
property at the date of her husband's death, which was zero.2'
The Commissioner contended that since the tranaction was a sale,
the gain should be determined by adding the net cash receipt to the
amount of the unassumed mortgage and deducting the taxpayer's basis
from that sum. He further asserted that this was the value of the property,
as determined for estate tax purposes (which, as pointed out, was equal
to the encumbrance), less the depreciation allowance due the taxpayer.
The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court and upheld the Commissioner's
contentions.22 The Supreme Court, in affirming, stated:
... we think that a mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt,
who sells the property subject to the mortgage and for additional
consideration, realizes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage as
well as the boot. If a purchaser pays boot, it is immaterial as to our
problem whether the mortgagor is also to receive money from the
17. 3A MCRTENS, op. cit. supra note 10, § 21.11.
18. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
19. The taking of depreciation by the taxpayer and utilizing the fair market value
unadjusted for the mortgage was unquestionably detrimental to the taxpayer's position.
See Rusoff, supra note 12, at 184; See also Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 845 (1949).
20. Beulah B. Crane, 3 T.C. 585 (1944).
21. The basis was determined to be zero because as pointed out above the property
was acquired through devise, and the adjusted basis thereof was its fair market value
at the time of the decedent's death-taken as equal to the amount of the mortgage as
determined for estate tax purposes in accord with INT. REv. CODe OF 1939, § 113(a) (5).
22. 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945).
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puchaser to discharge the mortgage prior to sale, or whether he is
merely to transfer subject to the mortgage - it may make a difference
to the puchaser and to the mortgagee, but not to the mortgagor.
Or put in another way, we are no more concerned with whether
the mortgagor is, strictly speaking, a debtor on the mortgage, than
we are with whether the benefit to him is, strictly speaking, a receipt
of money or property. We are rather concerned with the reality that
any owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which
the property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the mort-
gage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he transfers
subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial
as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an
equal amount had been assumed by another.23
This language, so heavily relied on by the majority, has been subjected
to much criticism. As one observer noted: "The Court, with doubtful
justification, took the buyer's willingness to pay cash over the mortgage
as proof that the value of the property in this case was greater than the
mortgage. The opinion thus invites the speculation that Mrs. Crane
might have been better off to give the property away without taking
any 'boot'."'24 It seems somewhat ironic that a taxpayer can be charged
with a gain from a sale or other disposition of property where he re-
ceives nothing of any real value. He has surrendered a possibly valuable
asset, received nothing (or only a nominal amount) in return, and may
yet face substantial capital gains tax. The possibility thus arises that
one could lose his property by foreclosure and, although having suffered
an economic loss, be subject to taxation to the extent that the discharged
liability exceeded the basis of the property foreclosed.25
Application of the rule, enunciated in Crane, that a transferor
"realizes" an economic benefit on the disposition of mortgaged property,
regardless of personal responsibility, can be illustrated by the following
hypothetical:
A taxpayer purchases a depreciable property for $15,000, subject
to a mortgage of $10,000 (the taxpayer does not assume the indebted-
ness), giving him a total cost basis, under the Crane rationale, of $25,000.
While the property is held by the taxpayer, depreciation deductions
aggregate $16,000, thus the adjusted basis becomes $9,000. The property
is then transferred by the taxpayer still subject to the mortgage, but for
no additional consideration. Applying the Crane rule, the transferor
would realize a gain of $1,000, the difference between the amount realized
(no cash, but the full $10,000 unassumed mortgage indebtedness) and the
adjusted basis of $9,000.
Crane itself involved property acquired by devise and found addi-
tional justification in certain administrative practices and rulings related
23. 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
24. Lurie, Mortgagors with "Negative Equities" and "Negative Bases," N.Y.U.
10TIl INST. ON FED. TAX. 71, 73 (1952).
25. Schlesinger, Disposition of Property Having a Negative Basis, N.Y.U. 15TH
INST. ON FD. TAX. 339, 340 (1957).
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to inherited property.26 Additionally, broad interpretation was given to
the term "property" as used in Section 113(a) (5) of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code.27 The regulations 28 apparently required that a quite broad
definition be given to the concept of "property," and that its value be
set at the fair market value utilized for estate tax purposes, unaffected
by encumbrances. An interesting possibility for a different result from
the decision could be postulated if the estate from which the property
descended had itself been free from the indebtedness. Section 81.38 of
Regulation 10529 provides for inclusion of only the equity value in the
gross estate, where the estate is not liable on the debt. It thus appears
that the "equity" interpretation advocated by the taxpayer was not
necessarily excluded from Section 113(a) (5) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939.30 Regardless of speculation, Crane established that un-
assumed mortgages should be included in the basis of inherited property.
Extension of the doctrine, enunciated in Crane, to "purchase" situations
was left for subsequent decisions.3 '
IV.
EXTENSION OF THE RULE
In Blackstone Theatres Co.,82 inclusion of the full amount of an
encumbrance in the depreciation basis for the property was upheld,
although the taxpayer had no personal liability thereunder. The Tax
Court, relying chiefly on the Crane case for its decision, stated:
• . . [W]hatever vitality respondent's present position, or a
sterner one he asserts he may have taken, may have had before
the Supreme Court spoke in Crane v. Commissioner, [Citation
omitted], it can not now be said to have survived the broad sweep
of that decision. From Crane we can deduce the following applicable
principles: (a) The basis for given property includes liens thereon,
even though not personally assumed by the taxpayer; and (b) the
depreciation allowance should be computed on the full amount of
this basis. These principles, we believe, are controlling in this pro-
ceeding, and should be dispositive of the one litigated issue presented.3 3
26. Greenbaum, The Basis of Property Shall Be The Cost of Such Property:
How is Cost Defined?, 3 TAx. L. Rgv. 351, 355 (1948).
27. Now § 1014(a) of the INT. REv. CODE or 1954.
28. Treas. Reg. 101, art. 113(a) (5)-1 (c) (1938) ; Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.70 (1944)
Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.38 (1942).
29. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.38 (1942).
30. See Note, 21 So. CAL. L. REv. 112, 115-16 (1947).
31. In a "purchase" situation, the question is not so much a meaning of "property"
as it is of "cost" - § 113(a) of INT. REv. CODE oF 1939, and § 1012 of INT. REV. CODE
or 1954. This distinction as between amount included in cost basis, or basis of property
acquired some other way, as in Crane, through devise, has been raised in subsequent
cases, as a major point of distinction. See Respondent's brief, p. 12, in Columbus and
Greenville Railway Co. v. Comm'r, on appeal to the 5th Circuit, from the Tax Court
decision, 42 T.C. 834 (1964).
32. 12 T.C. 801 (1949).
33. Id. at 804.
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This case directly presented the question of inclusion of an unassumed
debt in a purchase basis, and involved, to an extent, the meaning of
"cost."'3 4 Exclusion of this debt from the "cost" could have found justifica-
tion in the cases on modification or cancellation of debts, that held the
owner of the encumbered property (who was not personally liable thereon)
did not realize taxable income to the extent the debt was cancelled .
5
In Parker v. Delaney,3a the transferor disposed of his interest in
property which was again subject to an unassumed encumbrance. Neither
cash nor any other property was tendered by the transferee, who was
also the mortgagee. The transferor had taken annual depreciation deduc-
tions. The First Circuit held that a gain had been realized on the transfer
and deemed Crane applicable even though there had been no receipt of
cash or other "boot."'3 T In a concurring opinion, Judge Magruder criti-
cized such extension of the Crane rule and proposed an alternative approach
to determine the basis. 3 8 Some criticism has been leveled at this approach:
Judge Magruder's approach had the theoretical advantage of
permitting a less strained construction of the phrase, 'amount realized,'
and using it retroactively in Parker v. Delaney would have done
no harm, since the result would have been the same. Used pros-
pectively, however, it would add complexity to the calculation of
deductions for depreciation without preventing the tax avoidance and
hardship which may result from the Crane case. 39
The Second Circuit further extended the Supreme Court's decision,
involving a voluntary conversion, to the forced sale of mortgaged prop-
erty. 40 In Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, Inc., the view was adopted
that a separate condemnation award, paid to a mortgagee on an unassumed
mortgage, was taxable as gain to the owner of the property. The property
had been taken by eminent domain, the mortgage value being paid
directly to the mortgagee and the remainder to the owner. The Circuit
Court reversed the Tax Court, finding that the "property" converted
included the unassumed mortgage. The Court observed:
In practical terms, for the purpose of protecting his property
from foreclosure, where the value of the property is greater than
the amount of the mortgage, the taxpayer-mortgagor has to treat
the obligations of a non-assumed mortgage as if they were his
personal obligations. Payment to the mortgagee relieved the owner
of this necessity. 41
34. See text relating to notes 26 to 30. See also, note 31.
35. Ernst Kern Co., 1 T.C. 249 (1942), appeal dismissed (6th Cir. 1944) ; P. J.
Hiatt, 35 B.T.A. 292 (1937). This point may be moot under the 1954 Code, but it
was still relevant at the time of the Blackstone decision. See Rusoff, supra note 12,
at 192.
36. 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950).
37. This would seem to answer the question raised by the commentator quoted
in the text, at note 24, although the question as to the effect on Crane itself is still
open to speculation.
38. 186 F.2d 455, 459; 3 MIRTENS, op. cit. supra note 10, § 20.02.
39. Rusoff, supra note 12, at 187.
40. Comm'r v. Fortee Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1954), rev'g. 19 T.C.
99 (1952), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 826 (1954).
41. 211 F.2d 915, 916 (1954).
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The Tax Court, through Judge Murdock (who was the lone dis-
senter in Blackstone), had held Crane inapplicable because it defined
"amount realized" only for purposes of computing "gain or loss" and
"basis" on a voluntary disposition or sale.42 It had further found the
non-recognition requirements of Section 1033 satisfied by the reinvestment
of an amount equal to the proceeds received by the taxpayer for his
"equity" interest in the property. 43
Although the Tax Court had been reversed in Fortee Properties, Inc.,
it followed its own opinion in that case to decide Frank W. Babcock.44
There, the part of a condemnation award paid by the state to the holder
of a purchase money mortgage, which had not been assumed, was held
not includable in the taxpayer's basis for determining recognition of gain.
The Tax Court, reviewing the Court of Appeals decision in Commissioner
v. Fortee Properties, Inc., concluded:
The Court of Appeals in holding in effect that the taxpayer
had not complied with the requirements of Section 112(f), took
the view that, within the meaning of that section, the property
sold was the full property and not merely the owner's rights over
and above encumbrances, and that the payment to the mortgagee,
even though liability had not been assumed by the taxpayer, benefited
it. In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
In our consideration of the Fortee case we gave thorough con-
sideration to the Crane case and held that it had no application
since it did not involve Section 112(f) of'the Code. In the Crane
case the question presented was how a taxpayer, who acquired de-
preciable property subject to an unassumed mortgage, held it for
a period, and finally sold it, still so encumbered, must compute the
taxable gain .... We have given careful consideration to the holding
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Fortee case,
but with all due respect to that Court we adhere to the position taken
by us in that case.
45
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision.46 The
Court of Claims, though in an involuntary conversion situation, has
followed Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, Inc., in determining how
much the owner might reinvest tax free by adding, out of his own funds,
an amount equal to that awarded to the mortgagee.47 The controversy
over extending the Crane rationale to the area of involuntary conversion
still remains unsettled. But, as one observer has noted:
The preferable view seems to be that amounts realized paid in
liquidation of a non-assumed mortgage should be included in the
amount realized on the disposition. If not included, the effect is
42. Fortee Properties, Inc., 19 T.C. 99 (1952).
43. Id. at 103.
44. 28 T.C. 781 (1957).
45. Id. at 785.
46. 259 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1958).
47. Wala Garage, Inc. v. U.S., 163 F. Supp. 378 (Ct. CI. 1958).
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that "amount realized" has one meaning for purposes of § 1033
and another for § 1001.
Moreover, unless the amount of the encumbrance is includable
a taxpayer receives more favorable treatment upon involuntary con-
versions than he does upon a voluntary exchange of his encumbered
property for like kind property under § 1031. Under that section,
the transfer of a non-assumed mortgage is specifically treated as a
receipt of money by the transferor. [I.R.C. § 1031(d) ]. 4 8
It has been established that, if an obligation existed and formed part
of the taxpayer's acquisition cost, the fact that the obligation was ex-
tinguished,49 became unenforceable, 50 or was settled for a lesser amount,5 '
did not affect the cost basis.
Considerable theorizing stems from the possibility, presented by the
Crane decision, that property may have a "negative basis." Such a situa-
tion would arise where "property is subject to debt in excess of its
basis."'52 The thought of a negative or sub-zero basis has been viewed
by the Tax Court as incompatible with a "fundamental concept of income
taxation. '53 The Supreme Court was apparently aware of this, and con-
cerned with it, in Crane, but left it open and reserved the question. 54
Until the Easson decision, 55 no clear authority existed in the area
of negative basis. That case involved the allowance of a postponement
of income realization where property was transferred from a controlling
shareholder to the controlled corporation. Easson was governed by the
pre-1954 Code, § 112(b) (5) of the 1939 Code; similar transactions
arising under the 1954 Code would be governed by § 357(c) which pro-
vides for a recognition of gain in such a transaction to the extent that
the mortgage exceeds the basis.50 Although the factual problem presented
in Easson is now resolved for post 1954 transactions under § 357(c)
in favor of the Tax Court decision, the Circuit Court's reversal estab-
lishes an important precedent for acknowledging that in the proper cir-
cumstances a negative basis may be appropriate. 57 Yet, although a nega-
tive basis may be permitted in the proper situation, the long-standing rule
prohibiting depreciation deductions below a zero basis remains intact.58
48. Fouts, Gain Upon Involuntary Conversions, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
993, 1000-01 (1960). Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(11), incorporates the Crane
rationale into § 1033.
49. Edward W. Edwards, 19 T.C. 275 (1952).
50. Amphitrite Corporation, 16 T.C. 1140 (1951).
51. Marion A. Blake, 8 T.C. 546 (1947).
52. Peavy, Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations, 102 J. ACCOUNTANCY
36, 39 (Aug. 1956).
53. Jack L. Easson, 33 T.C. 963, 970 (1960).
54. 331 U.S. 1, 11, 14, n.37.
55. Easson v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'g 33 T.C. 963 (1960).
56. Schlesinger, Negative Basis, Recognized in Easson as Possible, Will AriseOnly Rarely, 16 J. TAXATrON 212, 214 (April 1962).
57. For an excellent discussion of the case and the general area of negative basis,
see Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1352 (1962) ; see also Lurie, Taxing
Transfers of Mortgaged Property, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 611 (1954) ; Spears, Mortgages
in Excess of Basis, 11 So. CAL. TAX INST. 883 (1959).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(a) (1956), as amended T.D. 6507, 1960-2 CuM.
BULL. 91.
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In Albany Car Wheel Co.,59 the amount of the obligation was so
contingent and indeterminate that no part of the indebtedness was found
includable in the basis of the property. The taxpayer had purchased
the assets of a predecessor corporation and carried on its business. By
the purchase agreement between the successor corporation and its prede-
cessor, the purchaser-taxpayer became obligated to procure a release of
the predecessor's liability for severance pay under a union contract. The
taxpayer obtained such a release by substituting itself for its predecessor.
However, the taxpayer was liable only where it failed to give notice of
termination of operations to the employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the Tax Court's decision that the obligation was too contingent or specula-
tive to be included in the cost basis, observing:
The new contract, however, differed from the old contract in
a crucial respect, since it provided for the payment of severance
pay only if petitioner could not give the required notice. If, as
actually happened, petitioner was able to make its decision to termin-
ate operations far enough in advance to give notice, it could dis-
charge its obligation without incurring any expenses for severance
pay. We agree with the conclusion of the Tax Court that petitioner's
obligation under the union contract was therefore too speculative to
be includable in the cost basis of the acquired assets.60
In Columbus and Greenville Railway Co.,61 the Tax Court ruled
that an unassumed mortgage could not be included in the taxpayer's
basis for computing depreciation deductions. The taxpayer was the suc-
cessor corporation to a defunct railroad company and all the properties
acquired were taken subject to prior'mortgages. By an agreement, entered
into three years after acquisition of the properties, the mortgage obligations
were cancelled. Prior to that time, no entries had been made on the tax-
payer's books to reflect the indebtedness. Since the taxpayer's "first
entries, reflecting the liabilities, were made subsequent to the release,
he achieved a stepped-up basis, which permitted a greater yearly deprecia-
tion deduction. No portion of the indebtedness had been paid by the
taxpayer nor did he include any of it as income to him subsequent to
the release. The Commission disallowed depreciation deductions based on
the stepped-up basis. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner, and
further denied petitioner's inclusion of the released-unassumed mortgages
in his cost. The Tax Court took the position that the indebtedness in
question was, like the obligation in Albany Car Wheel Co.,62 too specula-
tive in nature, "... and that this fact precluded the inclusion of any of this
contingent amount in petitioner's original cost basis in the property."6 '
59. 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964), affirming per curiam 40 T.C. 831 (1963).
60. Id. at 653-54.
61. 42 T.C. 834 (1964), appeal pending in the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals.
62. 40 T.C. 831 (1963), aff'd. per curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964).
63. 42 T.C. 834, 849.
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The Tax Court's opinion does concede that "Petitioner's principal theory
finds some support in Crane v. Commissioner .... -04 but continues:
. . . whether the theory of the Crane case means that in a 'purchase'
situation the cost of the property acquired includes the liens thereon,
even though not personally assumed by the purchaser . . . we need
not decide here, because we do not think the theory of the Crane case
is applicable here in any event. 65
The Tax Court went on:
Assuming for purposes of discussion, but without deciding that
the theory of the Crane case may be applied in the ordinary pur-
chase situation, we do not think it can be applied under the cir-
cumstances of this case because to do so would be to negate the
basic concept of depreciation deductions, which is to permit a tax-
payer to recover through depreciation allowances only his cost or
other basis in the property. In the cases cited by petitioner, thw
amounts in question had been a part of the taxpayer's purchase
price of the property or had been a part of the cost of constructing
the property. And in Crane the value of the property was admittedly
equal to the face amount of the mortgage subject to which the prop-
erty was received. In each of those cases the obligation to which the
property was subject at the time it was acquired was fixed in amount
and was a part of the original cost of the property to taxpayer or,
in the Crane case, was the value of the property inherited. Such
is not the situation in the present case. 66
It would appear that the extension of the Crane rationale in the
Columbus and Greenville case presented the court with some difficulties
and misgivings. This might indicate the Tax Court's view of the desir-
ability of extending the Crane rule into the "purchase" situation. The
Tax Court has disputed the validity of such extension in other cases,67 and
objection has come from commentators on the topic. 68 Such a trend
would reject Crane's application in cases which involve a determination
of "whether the amount of the mortgage debt was included in the cost."69
V.
CONCLUSION
Although it could be argued, as an original proposition, that where
the buyer assumes no personal liability, the existence of a mortgage is
64. Id. at 847.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Frank W. Babcock, 28 T.C. 781 (1957) ; Fortee Properties, Inc., 19 T.C. 99
(1952); Woodsam Associates, Inc., 16 T.C, 649 (1951).
68. For a criticism of the extension of the Crane rule see Engel, Effects of the
Crane Case, N.Y.U. 6TH INST. ON FMD. TAX. 379 (1947) ; Note, 49 COL. L. Rev. 845
(1949); Note, 33 IOWA L. REv. 143 (1947).
69. Respondent's brief p. 12, in the Columbus and Greenville Railway Co. appeal
to the 5th Circuit, attempts to distinguish the Crane case from the Columbus and
Greenville case on that basis. This is similar to the discussion in the text, supra
notes 26 to 35.
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not a sufficient investment to warrant an inclusion in basis, the Supreme
Court decision in Crane v. Commissioner has settled the issue.70 A mort-
gage, even though not assumed by the mortgagor as his personal debt,
is includable in the "amount realized" as "property" received.71
The rule enunciated by the Supreme Court has been extended from
the inherited property situation presented in Crane to what has been
called the "purchase" situation. The existing limits on the extended rule
appear to be that the obligation must be neither too contingent,72 nor
so speculative as to be illusory.73
The Crane rule, basically, is in accord with proper accounting and
tax procedures. Yet it is subject to certain criticisms which may be
best cured legislatively. Under Crane, the amount recovered by the
Government is less than the amount saved by the mortgagor through
depreciation deductions, since the latter are offset against ordinary income
and the gains are capitally treated. This aspect of the decision offers
those in the higher income brackets a tax avoidance method. 74 Conversely,
the situation might be presented where the amount recovered by the
Government will exceed the amount of the depreciation deductions. This
can occur either where the taxpayer has so small an income as not to
benefit from the deductions, or where his tax rate in the years prior to
the sale was less than the applicable capital gains rate.75 Crane itself
is an example of such a hardship.76
Numerous remedies have been suggested, 77 most of which would be
best effected through legislation. One problem which has plagued the
Tax Court and commentators,78 and which could be judicially settled, is
the advisability of the continued extension of the Crane doctrine into
the "purchase" area. The Tax Court has again indicated its disapproval
of the extension in the Columbus and Greenville case, which is now before
the Fifth Circuit on Appeal. A pronouncement from the appellate level
would seem most desirable.
Kenneth L. Gross
70. See concurring opinion of Judge Magruder in Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455(1st Cir. 1950) ; see also Rubin, supra note 1.
71. Cran v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); R. O'Dell & Sons Co., 8 T.C. 1165
(1947), aff'd, 169 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948).
72. Albany Car Wheel Co., 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964).
73. Columbus and Greenville Railway Co., 42 T.C. 834 (1964).
74. Note, 33 IOWVA L. Rev. 143, 147 n.26 (1947) ; Note, 49 COL. L. Rtv. 845,
849 (1949).
75. Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 845, 848-51 (1949).
76. Ibid.
77. Note, 13 U. CHi. L. REv. 510, 514 (1946) ; Comment, 26 TEXAs L. REv. 796,
799 (1948) ; Rusoff, supra note 12, at 197.
78. Supra notes 67 and 68.
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